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Abstract 
The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of 
China’s newly privatized large firms. In this paper, we analyze shareholders as agents that can 
both harm and benefit companies. We examine the ownership structure of 826 listed corporations 
and find that government shareholding is surprisingly large. Its effect on corporate value is found 
to be negative, but non-monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as 
government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this corporate value begins to increase. We 
interpret this in terms of ownership concentration and the advantages of government partiality. 
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 Introduction 
  The Chinese economy has performed exceptionally well in the past twenty five years, 
with GDP more than quadrupling since reforms began in the late 1970s and the economy 
predicted to overtake that of the United States in terms of purchasing power parity by 2015. The 
stock market has grown fast and has attracted Morgan Stanley Inc. and other international 
investors, but some issues which are essential to an understanding of China’s reform and its 
public listed companies (PLCs) have not been well addressed.   
  China did not follow the reform path favored by transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, which focused on complete and rapid liberalization, privatization and 
democratization (see e.g., World Bank, 1996).  Rather, China’s reform has been constructed to 
achieve the joint objectives of improved economic efficiency and ensuring that reforms remain 
acceptable to the Communist Party in power by increasing the economic pie while allocating a 
share of those additional resources to those in power (Qian, 2003). This approach to reform has 
been analyzed with respect to market liberalization (see Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000) and early 
ownership reform, which relied on the growth of new firms in township-village enterprises 
(TVEs) (see, e.g., Li, 1996; Chun and Wang, 1994; Che and Qian, 1998).  In the past decade, the 
reform process has extended to the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector that still comprises a 
significant share of industrial output, (see Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2004).  The emphasis has been 
to improve performance by corporatizing the former state owned firms, listing them on China’s 
stock exchanges and selling shares to non-state owners in order to facilitate tougher corporate 
governance.  
    The companies now listed on China’s stock market are among the most profitable 
enterprises in China and their business operations and governance structures are modeled on 
American corporations. However, state ownership still plays a major role.  The government is 
found to be the majority shareholder in 31 percent of Chinese PLCs, and to hold more than 10 
percent stakes in 41 percent of PLCs.  This is a much higher shareholding than observed in either 
developed or other emerging markets (see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000).   
  Economists generally view government ownership as being detrimental to corporate 
performance. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) show that private ownership is preferable 
to state ownership because the government has a “grabbing hand” that extorts firms for the   2
benefit of politicians and bureaucrats at the expense of corporate wealth.  Estrin and Perotin 
(1991) argue that, even if the government is not corrupt, the firms under the control of the 
government shareholder cannot concentrate on profit maximization, because the state has 
political as well as economic objectives while governance will be weaker. These factors, 
including the absence of a bankruptcy constraint, are predicted to lead to lower efficiency in state 
owned firms than privately owned ones.  Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention.  
For example, Megginson and Netter (2001) conclude that “[the weight of empirical research] is 
now decisively in favor of the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more 
profitable than otherwise comparable state owned firms.” However, Blanchard and Shleifer 
(2000) and Qian (2003) suggest that in China government ownership can in fact be helpful, to 
company performance. Certainly some firms under the control of the Chinese government are 
well liked by international investors, including Warren Buffet. The positive roles that the 
government shareholder can play come from preferential commercial treatment as well as 
governance advantages when state ownership is concentrated.      Combining the theory of 
inefficient government ownership with the Chinese institutional environment leads us to 
hypothesize that the firms under the control of a private shareholder will perform better than 
those under the control of the government shareholder. However we go on to argue that there 
will also be a non-linear relation between corporate performance and government shareholding 
in China’s mixed enterprises, because of the benefits that can be obtained from the government 
shareholder especially at high levels of state ownership.   
In the paper, we examine this hypothesis empirically using a large sample of Chinese 
PLCs containing 2660 firm-year observations. In particular, we explore the effects of different 
levels of government shareholding on corporate value. In line with the Western literature, the 
overall impact of state shareholding on corporate values in China is found to be negative. 
However, the firms with diffused shareholding structures are found to perform worse than both 
privately and state owned firms.  Hence the relation between corporate value and the size of 
government shareholdings is found to be non-monotonic; in fact it is U-shaped, with a higher 
level of corporate value with lower levels of state ownership than with higher ones.  That is, 
when the size of government shareholding is sufficiently large, the effect of government 
shareholding on corporate performance is marginally positive relative to situations where private 
and state ownership are more equally balanced. This finding is robust, including to questions of   3
reverse causality, and is consistent with the findings from previous work on China that reforms 
have managed to provide incentives for private agents and the government which lead both to act 
in ways that enhance efficiency (see Qian, 2003). 
  In the following section, we set the scene by providing information on the emergence of 
Chinese PLCs and the Stock Exchanges, including ownership structures.  Our hypotheses about 
the performance of firms as government ownership levels vary are outlined in the third section, 
and the econometric methods and results including questions of endogeneity in the fourth.  We 
draw conclusions in the fifth section. 
 
I. Shareholding in Chinese PLCs and the institutional environment 
  In this section, we use our data to enrich our understanding of the reform process in the 
former state owned sector, focusing particularly on retained government ownership.  We first 
present the data set and provide a brief description of the Chinese institutional environment 
before examining the ownership structures of Chinese PLCs. 
 
A. The data set 
Our data is based on the audited Annual Reports from all PLCs and share price data from 
the two Stock Exchanges. Taiwan Economic Journal is a leading vendor on Chinese PLCs, but 
their data contain a large number of missing values and domestic investment bankers and 
security analysts tend to use the Genius database instead. The Genius database is widely used by 
the Chinese investors on the stock market. We have constructed a new data set by combining 
both databases with other complementary sources (see the Appendix). This covers accounting 
information, the holding stakes of large shareholders, and daily share prices from 1994 to 1998, 
during which time the regulatory framework was relatively consistent. The 1994 Company Law 
formally legislates and governs joint-stock companies. In the same year, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission also introduced a series of six rules called Contents and Forms of The 
Information Release by PLCs, which formatted the annual reports. In 1999, a new version of the 
Company Law was introduced which led to many changes in the information collected. For this 
reason we do not seek to extend our analysis beyond 1998.  
Our data set excludes fund management companies. Their operations are distinctly 
different from those of industrial firms and the government is not allowed to own them. We also   4
exclude firms that do not issue shares to domestic investors so we do not have to use the share 
prices from the foreign investors market.  The data set contains 287 companies in 1994, 311 in 
1995, 517 in 1996, 719 in 1997, and 826 in 1998, summing to 2660 firm-year observations in 
twenty-one industries. The description of corporate features and ownership structures is based on 
1998 data.  
 
B. The institutional environment  
Prior to reforms there were virtually no private firms in the Chinese industrial sector.  
Large enterprises were either fully owned by the state or collectively owned, and usually 
controlled by a multitude of bureaucrats in central and local government. Enterprises in China 
before the advent of reform were thus virtually sub-units of various tiers of the government 
rather than commercial entities in their own right. All financing was paid out of the state budget, 
the prices of production factors and products were fixed, and the government set production 
targets. Furthermore, enterprises were required to provide their employees with housing, 
schooling, and even a funeral service when they died. The incentive problem is illustrated by the 
fact that managerial pay was not much higher than the wages of workers.  
  The economic environment for SOEs began to change in the early 1990s (see Qian, 2003), 
with a clarification of property rights, changes in corporate governance, and the use of 
commercial modes of operation. The clarification of property rights has often involved 
recapitalization and partial privatization.
1 Many former SOEs were restructured to form joint 
stock companies that have more than one owner. Combining this with a pairing of control rights 
to residual returns provides owners with an incentive to maximize the value of these enterprises 
(Li, 1997) in an increasingly important sector of the economy.  According to figures produced by 
the National Bureau of Statistics in China in 1999, joint stock companies made up 3.3 percent of 
the total number of firms in China, but generated 7.3 percent of the industrial GDP and 14.6 
percent of profits. Between 1994 and 1998, the number of joint stock companies grew by 28 
percent per year and their contribution to the GDP grew by 36 percent per year. 
  Political control of these firms has been significantly reduced since 1993. In the past, 
managers were monitored through employee associations and the enterprise branch of the 
Communist Party, but since 1993 the law has explicitly forbidden the secretaries of the various 
                                                           
1 The Chinese government does not in fact recognize the term “privatization”.   5
branches of the Communist Party to interfere with corporate management.  However, the Party 
and the government can influence the firms through voting rights from its shareholding.  In 1994, 
a formal Company Law was introduced to create a set of modern governance structures. This 
require firms to be commercially operated under the rule of market competition: for example 
supply and demand must decide prices; finances must be raised through banks and other 
creditors; firms must pay dividends to their shareholders; pay back interest and principal to their 
creditors, and tax to the government. Though China’s economy is still characterized by 
widespread government ownership coupled with weak legal enforcement of the new legislation, 
we would contend that the SOEs have now become independent commercial entities. 
 
C. Corporate governance and the stock market 
  The 1994 Company Law stipulates that the Board of Directors monitors managers. 
Directors are de jure elected at a general meeting of shareholders under a one-share-one-vote 
system. The Board of Directors is usually composed of the delegates of the large shareholders, 
who can nominate managers to be members of the Board. When the government is the largest 
shareholder, a former party secretary or a retired bureaucrat is usually assigned to be the 
chairman of the board. 
  For example, the government holds 88.6 percent of shares in the firm Qinggong 
Machinery.  The other shareholders in Qinggong Machinery are family investors and some 
township-village enterprises. The government agent that controls the government’s shareholding 
is the Shanghai Electronics Group (an SOE), which is fully owned by the state and operated like 
a department of the Shanghai Municipal Government. The mayor of the Shanghai Municipal 
Government and his management committee, chosen by the central government in Beijing, 
decide on the appointment of the board of the Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Company 
Limited. Mr. Zhao Dingzhai was appointed to be both President and General Manager. Other 
board members include communist party secretaries, union representatives, senior management 
and other companies, both SOE and legal person. There were no external directors, or directors 
representing minority shareholders, on the board.  
  Once elected, the duties of directors include approving annual reports and corporate 
strategy, appointing a general manager, and monitoring management. There is also a Supervisory 
Board, whose members are mainly employees. This has inherited the legacy of the employee   6
association under planning but its role is purely advisory. The general manager is in charge of 
the daily operation of the enterprise, with bonuses linked to corporate performance, although the 
absolute sizes of bonuses are small. The top management team can be shareholders of the 
company, but these shares cannot be transferred during their tenure and securities laws require 
that managerial shareholdings be disclosed to the public. In practice, managerial shareholding is 
miniscule in China, perhaps because stock option schemes have been rare.  In our 1998 data set, 
we find that managers held, on average, only 0.005 percent of the total shares in public listed 
companies.    
The Chinese stock market comprises the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which began to operate in December 1990 and July 1991, 
respectively. There is no fundamental difference between the two in terms of legislation and 
regulations; they were separated to encourage competition. Table 1 shows that the market has 
grown rapidly; between 1992 and 1998, market capitalization increased at an average rate of 84.7 
percent per year. At the end of 1998, total market capitalization was about a quarter of China’s 
GDP. The number of listed companies grew by 62 percent annually, from 53 PLCs in 1992 to 
851 PLCs in 1998. However, the market is still in the early stages of development, as reflected 
by its high volatility, trading problems, and the threat of policy interventions
2.  [Table 1 here] 
 
D. Ownership structure of Chinese PLCs 
  These Chinese PLCs are usually very young, with an average age of 14 years and a 
median age of seven years. PLCs are either newly formed or older companies restructured during 
the period of reform. However, the most striking feature of Chinese PLCs is their ownership 
structure.  The Chinese stock market classifies owners of shares into five groups: state, legal 
person, employee, tradable-A shares and shares denominated in a foreign currency, all providing 
equal voting rights.  The boundaries between the categories are not always clear; for example 
institutional shareholders do not own legal-person shares and foreign shareholders do not only 
own shares denominated in foreign currency.  But this is the only currently available 
                                                           
2 At the end of 1998, the turnover rate was 291 percent and the price/earning ratio was 33.4. Moreover, since the 
legal enforcement of securities legislation in China is weak, insider trading and market manipulation is widespread 
and frequently reported in the press. To control risks, the government frequently holds policy talks; one on the high 
P/E ratios of the stock market at the end of 1996 brought down the stock index by 10 percent. The market is also 
segmented: about 60 percent of shares are restricted in terms of their tradability and only 5 percent of shares are 
allowed to be invested in a foreign currency.   7
classification system for share ownership (see also Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi, Wu and Zhang, 
2000). The three main categories of shareholder are the state, legal persons and tradable A shares, 
each with around 30 percent of total shares.  The state’s shareholding is, on average, gradually 
declining between 1994 and 1998, matched by an increase in the non-tradable holdings of 
domestic institutions (legal-person shares).  Interestingly, employee ownership is negligible in 
Chinese PLCs. However, this formal ownership structure is somewhat misleading, since it does 
not clarify the nature of owners or trace the ultimate owners.   
  [Table 2 here]  
Chinese law requires that the stakes of the largest ten shareholders are reported.   
In Table 2, we classify their natures as a) another domestic industrial company; b) investment 
fund, securities companies and other investment firms; c) foreign investors; d) family or 
individual investors; e) government.
3 Categories a) – d) together can be classified as the non-
government shareholders. Using the data from the stock market, we seek to follow the 
methodology of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1999) in order to trace ultimate 
shareholders by examining pyramids, cross shareholdings and reciprocal shareholdings. The 
method defines a pyramid as an entry that has a shareholding in one PLC, which in turn owns 
another corporation and so on.  Cross-shareholding are defined as a condition that exists when a 
company has a controlling shareholders and own shares in a firm that belongs to its chain of 
control, i.e. if A holds part of B and B holds part of A.  Reciprocal shareholding occurs when a 
company owns part of itself.  La Porta et al’s   (1999) weakest-link concept is adopted here i.e., 
if A hold 15 percent of B, and B holds 20 percent of C, then A holds 15 percent of C. .In our 
sample, 167 companies of the 846 reported that another PLC among the largest ten shareholders 
in 1998, with an average holding size of 1.5 percent.  However, if we use a 10 percent threshold, 
only 19 firms are found to be pyramids or crossholdings, in the sense that an ultimate 
shareholder holds 10 percent of the company through another company.   
   In panel A of Table 2, we investigate the stakes of shareholding groups owning more 
than 50 percent, 30 percent and 10 percent of the equity respectively.  These thresholds reflect 
majority ownership (50 percent); the CSRC measure of relative control (30 percent) and 
                                                           
3 Non-government shareholders include institutional and individual shareholders. Institutional shareholders can be 
financial companies, foreign companies, collective holding entities, or other domestic industrial company such as 
PLCS or TVEs. Banks are forbidden to purchase and trade in PLCs, although in the past some have held shares. 
Investment trusts, mutual funds, and securities companies may also have some government ownership, but are now 
fully commercialized.   8
Claessens et al’s (2000) and Faccio and Lang’s (2002) measure of the controlling threshold (10 
percent).  Significantly, the government as owner continues to play an important role in Chinese 
PLCs, quite out of line with that observed in other market or transition economies (see Bennett, 
Estrin and Maw, 2004).  The state has a controlling (50 percent) interest in 31 percent of firms, 
and a large stake (10 percent) in a further 13 percent of firms.  No other category of owner plays 
a comparable role, and the only other major category of shareholders is other domestic 
companies.
4 While domestic companies hold more than at 10 percent stake in 41 percent of 
companies, almost as many as the state, their average shareholding is much lower and the 
category of domestic companies rarely has outright control (in less than 11 percent of Chinese 
PLCs). 
  Meanwhile, the ownership structure of Chinese PLCs is highly concentrated (see panel B 
of Table 2).  The five largest shareholders account for 60.6 percent of equity, compared with 
25.4 percent in the United States and 33.1 percent in Japan.  The largest shareholder on average 
holds more than 40 percent of the equity.  These high levels of ownership concentration are in 
part a consequence of the high levels of retained state ownership in Chinese PLCs. 
  In summary, Chinese PLCs are distinguished from their Western counterparts by the 
scale of government ownership and the concentration of ownership, both governmental and 
private. One can hypothesize a marked difference between the government as shareholder and 
non-government shareholders, characterized by the government’s pursuit of its own political 
interests and its capacity for helping or harming the firm commercially in the process. In the 
following sections, we explore the nature of that difference at a theoretical and empirical level. 
 
II. Detrimental and beneficial effects of government shareholding 
Following the literature, we hypothesize that the government ownership is generally 
detrimental (see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). That is, the firms with partial government 
ownership are expected to perform worse than those without any government ownership, and the 
                                                           
4 In contrast to market economies, no individual in China can hold more than 0.5 percent of the shares of any 
company.  This explains why this category is missing from the list of dominant shareholders.  Rich Chinese families 
as owners must present themselves as private joint stock companies.  For example, the largest shareholder of Orient 
Inc. Co. Ltd is the Orient Group, which, is registered as a joint-stock company. The entrepreneur, Zhang Hongwei, 
holds directly only 4.85 percent of this PLC and sits as the president of Orient Inc Co Ltd, but Mr. Zhang is the 
largest shareholder of the Orient Group. However, the ownership structure of an unlisted joint stock company is not 
released to the public. In this way, presenting themselves as an unlisted firm, rich families can circumvent the 5 
percent limitation. Such events were very rare before 1998.   9
firms under the dominant control of the government shareholder to perform worse than those 
under the control of a commercial shareholder. In this section, we develop a more comprehensive 
view of the government shareholder and argue that, under some circumstance, government 
shareholding may actually increase corporate value.  
 
A. Government shareholding is detrimental 
  Shleifer and Vishny (1994) have modeled a typical emerging market environment in 
which joint stock companies are dominated by the government as shareholder; an owner that 
interferes in corporate activity by using its voting rights to influence business decisions. Political 
interference is usually at the expense of corporate profitability (see Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1996); for example, politicians may use their control to deliberately transfer resources of firms to 
their political supporters (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  This suggests that government control of 
joint stock firms will be detrimental to corporate performance, a view confirmed empirically by 
Megginson and Netter (2001) for middle income countries and Djankov and Murrell (2002) for 
transition economies.   
  For example, the Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited, which has the 
government as majority shareholder, hired 38,000 employees for its core operation even though 
it did not need so many people. When it tried to lay off 17,000 employees, its government 
shareholder did not allow it to do so. Instead, the firm was forced to find jobs for its employees. 
It only succeeded in doing so for 13,000 of the employees it had originally planned to lay off, so 
it has had to pay the wages for the remaining 4,000. Although this satisfied the government 
shareholder’s political interests, it was at the expense of corporate wealth. 
  In the context of a joint stock company, the extent to which the government shareholder 
may interfere in corporate activity in the pursuit of its political interests depends on the extent of 
its voting rights. Generally, as its voting rights increase, so does the extent of its interference. 
However, the likelihood and magnitude of political interference stops increasing once the 
shareholding stakes of the government have reached a certain size. We therefore hypothesize that 
the firms with partial government ownership perform worse than these with no government 
shareholding, and the firms under the control of a government shareholder perform worse than 
these under the control of a commercial shareholder. This issue is explored empirically in Sun   10
and Tong (2003), who find a negative relation between the size of government shareholding and 
the market to book ratio, though this is only marginally significant at even the 10 percent level.   
We would argue that, all else equal, the influence of the government on a firm in which 
the government shareholder owns 51 percent of shares is the same as that in a firm in which the 
government owns 85 percent. Hence once the controlling stake threshold, which varies with the 
specific shareholding structure of a company, has been passed, the probability and magnitude of 
political interference reach their maximum. Assigning the threshold as  1 θ , we argue that, 
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where V is corporate value, B is the private benefits from political interference and a is the 
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B. The beneficial effect of government shareholding from corporate governance 
  Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh. (1994) establish that reducing or eliminating 
state ownership enhances performance by comparing corporate behavior before and after 
privatization. Comparing the performance of China’s PLCs before with after issue privatization, 
Wang, Xu, and Zhu. (2003), however, find that there is no significant improvement of corporate 
performance after share issue privatization. Wei, Varela, and D’Souza. (2003) further find that 
there is no improvement of corporate profitability, although they argue that, relative to the 
performance changes of fully state owned enterprises during the same period, listed firms 
relatively have better performance changes after privatization. Wang (2004) documents the sharp 
decline in post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, which suggests that reduction of 
government shareholding does not necessarily improve corporate performance.  
However the government shareholder can be helpful to the firm in some circumstances. 
For example, to reduce managerial agency costs, a government-dominated shareholding structure 
is more effective than a dispersed shareholding structure under a weak legal enforcement. This 
point can be illustrated by the case of Monkey King Co. This firm, with no large shareholder to 
monitor its activities, manipulated its accounts and squandered its cash flows.  This might have 
been prevented if there had been concentrated share ownership from any source, including the   11
government.  Corporate governance by the government shareholder may not be as strong as that 
of commercial shareholder but it exists and as Qian (2003) has stressed, the government has 
strong financial market interest in the successful performance of state owned firms.  Thus it is 
unsurprising that the Chinese State Council has an explicit policy guideline to remove managers 
from firms under government control if they have been responsible for losses over three 
successive years.  
  If there is to be government-based corporate governance within a firm, the state’s 
shareholding stake must be sufficiently large; if its voting rights are small, it is difficult for the 
government to control the managers. In addition, limited voting rights mean cash flow rights are 
also small, and since monitoring managers is costly, a government shareholder with small voting 
rights has weak incentives to do so. Naturally, as the size of the government’s shareholding stake 
increases and the proportion of cash flow received by the government shareholder starts to 
outweigh the monitoring cost of the managers, the government shareholder has more incentive to 
provide corporate governance.  
If we denote G  as the cost of corporate governance, we hypothesize, 
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C. The beneficial effect of government shareholding from preferential treatment 
The deficiencies of the Chinese business environment, in which markets do not always 
operate openly or fairly, gives politicians the ability to provide firm with privileged access to 
resources (see e.g., Che and Qian, 1998).  For Chinese PLCs, this means that the government 
shareholder is in a position to provide a wide range of preferential treatments. The partiality 
includes biased regulations when the government is regulator, preferential loans when the 
government is creditor, large orders for products when the government is a consumer and 
discounted sales of production when the government is a producer.  For example, Fu-Tian 
Express Way Co received direct subsides from the government to the tune of $18m, which 
represented 58 percent of its profits, and Shenzhen Municipal Government has a special 
committee to assist associated PLCs in financial distress.   
  However, government partiality comes at the expense of the financial interests or even 
the political interests of the government. Therefore, the government has no incentive to provide   12
such costly partiality to a firm in which its cash flow rights are small. Thus, the extent of 
preferential treatment provided by the government is correlated to its cash flow rights.  
Thus  3 0 0 θ > >
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where S denotes the cost of government partiality.  
 
D. Synergy of the grabbing hand and the helping hand 
Combining these arguments, we hypothesize that the relations between corporate 
performance and state ownership may therefore be more complex than simply negative and 
monotonic. One might instead expect that, while concentrated (dominant) private shareholding 
yields superior corporate performance to concentrated state ownership, as state shareholding 
increases the balance of disadvantage from state ownership would begin to be offset by the 
impact of the “helping hand” of the state and by concentrated state ownership.  One would 
expect performance to be at its minimum in mixed enterprises, where neither private nor state 
owners have sufficient control rights to provide effective corporate governance to the firm.  In 
such enterprises neither state nor private owners are dominant so managers may face conflicting 
objectives and demands and weaker corporate governance, which will lead to inferior 
performance.   
Based on the behaviors of political predation, corporate governance, and preferential 
treatment, the utility function of the government shareholder is as follows: 
Ua VB G S =×+− −             ( 5 )  
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  The relation between corporate value and government shareholding will therefore 
negative and then positive after a threshold. This simplified model here does not differentiate 
between voting rights and cash flow rights because the one-share-one-vote system makes the 
separation of voting rights and cash rights in China marginal (see Tian, 2000). 
 
I11. The effects of government shareholding on corporate value 
In this section, we first specify the estimating equations before outlining our proxies for 
corporate value, government shareholding and the control variables.  We go on to present the 
results of our empirical work in three stages; a comparison of entirely private firms and mixed 
ownership companies; a comparison of firms with government as the largest single shareholder 
against firms with private owners as the largest single shareholder; and finally an analysis of the 
impact of government shareholding (as a continuous variable) on corporate value.  We conclude 
the section with a discussion of possible endogeneity in our empirical work. 
 
A. The estimation model and variables 
  We explore the relation between corporate value and government shareholding using the 
following equation 
  it it it it V c Government Control α βε =+× +× +                           (10)  where  V 
continues to denote corporate value, Government is a measure of government shareholding and 
Control is a vector of control variables for firm i in year t.  We use the simplified Tobin’s Q and 
the return on assets (ROA) to approximate corporate value.  Tobin’s Q is an adjusted measure of 
the market value of the firm which we calculate as the sum of the market value of equity and 
book value of debt over the book value of total assets.
5 This is complemented by the ROA as an 
indicator of profitability in case share prices fail to reflect the true value of firms in China 
because of market efficiency issues. 
  Three variables are used to proxy the impact of government ownership. Private captures 
the distinction between entirely private and mixed enterprises. If the government is a shareholder 
of an enterprise, private is assigned the value of unity; otherwise, private is unity.  However, the 
influence of the government as owner may depend on whether the state has a controlling interest 
                                                           
5  This avoids arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates.  Chung and Pruitt (1994) show the 
explanatory power of the simplified Q is at least 96.6 percent of Lindenberg and Ross’s (1981) Tobin’s Q.   14
in the firm. There have been few instances of collaboration among other shareholders to counter 
the largest shareholder in China so perhaps the largest shareholder can be viewed as being in 
control. Prilarge is assigned the value of unity if the largest shareholder is the government; it is 
zero if a non-government shareholder has the largest stake.  Finally, we consider government 
shareholding as the proportion of state-owned shares to total shares, denoted State.  Given the 
possibility of a non-monotonic relation between Value and Government, State is entered into the 
estimating equation in linear and quadratic form as 
2 State . 
  Our specification of the control variables draws on the current literature in empirical 
corporate finance, though we are somewhat constrained by data availability for China’s PLCs.  
Gomes and Novaes (1999) argue that the presence of a second large owner monitors the 
controlling shareholder and prevents tunneling of corporate wealth. They therefore predict that 
the existence of a second large owner will be associated with a high market value.  Second is 
defined to take the value of one when there is a second shareholder (in addition to the controlling 
shareholder) with more than a 10 percent stake in a firm. We also use the Herfindhal index as a 
proxy of the shareholding concentration in some equations. However since this index is strongly 
correlated with government holdings, it is omitted in regressions, which include State.  Finally, 
since Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny  (1988) have established the importance of managerial 
ownership for Tobin’s Q, we include the proportion of shares held by the top management team, 
denoted Manager. 
We follow the finance literature in controlling for size in our corporate value equations. 
Large firms may have scale economies and better access to bank credits, which could improve 
corporate profitability (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999). The asset structure or tangibility is also 
argued to influence corporate valuation. Tangibility is approximated by the fixed asset ratio; the 
net fixed assets over total assets. It is expected that the fixed asset ratio has a negative impact on 
corporate value, as firms with a high proportion of intangible assets tend to belong to the new 
economy.  Since Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that capital 
structure is correlated to ROA and market-to-book value we also control for gearing; total 
liabilities over total asset. Further, a large literature argues that, given the enterprise life cycle, 
the age of a firm will be related to corporate profitability and market value. In China, new firms 
tend to have a higher value because of the reform process. We also use year dummies to capture 
rapid institutional change and macroeconomic shocks in different years.   15
 
B. Empirical results 
  We first compare the performance of the different categories of Chinese PLC by 
ownership type. The results confirm the negative impact of state ownership on corporate value.  
We go on to use regression analysis to estimate equation (1) on our data set using both OLS and 
panel data methods.  These regressions confirm our previous results, establish their robustness 
with respect to specification and estimation method and indicate that the relation between 
corporate value and government ownership stakes is non-monotonic.   
 
B.1. Performance by ownership type in Chinese PLCs  
Our first set of tests on the impact of government ownership involves a comparison of 
means and medians of corporate value in sub-samples of the data set categorized by ownership 
type.  This follows the method of Boardman and Vining (1989).  We use Student t-tests to 
compare mean values, and given the possibility of outlier effects, also employ Mann-Whitney U-
tests to investigate the significance of median differences.
6  Since we find no major difference 
between the results using the two methods, our reporting concentrates on mean differences, 
though both sets of tests are reported. 
  In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, we compare corporate value in firms with no state 
holding (NSE) against enterprises with some state shareholding (MEs).  In column (3) and (4), 
we compare firms where the largest shareholder is not the state (NSL) with firms with the state 
as largest shareholder (SL).  Finally in column (5) and (6) we compare firms where the dominant 
owner (>50 percent) is the state (Smaj) with firms where the dominant shareholder is not the 
state (NSmaj).  Table 3 shows that enterprises with no state ownership perform significantly 
better than the category of all mixed enterprises.  The mean of Q is 19 percent higher in entirely 
private than in mixed enterprises and the ROA is 18 percent higher.  When we look at firms 
where the largest shareholder is private, we again find significant differences to state dominated 
firms in means and medians for both measures of corporate value.  The shareholder with the 
largest stake is often the controlling shareholder in China, as there are few instances as yet of 
collaboration between smaller shareholders to counter the largest shareholder. If the government 
is the largest shareholder, Q decreases on average by 14 percent and ROA by 12 percent. When 
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we group firms by whether the majority shareholder is the government, we find that Q is on 
average 25 percent higher and ROA is 37 percent where the majority shareholder is not the 
government.  
 
B.2. Multivariate analysis 
Our regression analysis is based on equation (1).  We report the results of the pooled 
ordinary linear regressions adjusted by White robust estimators (OLS) and maximum log 
likelihood panel data estimation (MLP). OLS estimation with the robust standard errors produces 
consistent standard errors, even if the data is weighted or the residuals are not independently 
distributed. The F-statistics and R-squared are similar to the standard OLS estimations. Given 
that there may be concern about outliers, we also employ least-absolute value models (MAD 
models). Panel data models reduce the potential problem that omitted variables are correlated 
with explanatory variables. The cross-sectional OLS regression as the between estimator is less 
efficient because it discards the over-time information in the data in favor of simple means while 
model uses both the within and the between information. Our panel is unbalanced covering 287 
firms in 1994 and 826 firms in 1998 and wide, the results of Baltagi-Li LM tests support the 
assumption of random effects. The maximum log likelihood estimation of the MLP model is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient for our data
7.  Therefore, the following model is estimated 
it i it it x y ε ν β α + + + =                                                                              (11) 
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In the regressions we take the distribution of government shares as a continuous variable with the 
results reported under the polynomial forms, but the piecewise regressions were also performed, 
with the same results.  
  [Table 4 here] 
                                                           
7 Moulton (1986) shows that the standard errors of the OLS estimation for the one-way error component model with 
the unbalanced panel data set are biased. The GEE population-averaged panel data models are used to check the 
robustness of the MLP models. The results are very similar and the tables of the GEE models are not presented here.   17
  Table 4 presents the OLS and MLP regressions of equation (1) using private as the proxy 
for government ownership. The regressions have Q as dependent variable in columns (1) and (2), 
using OLS and MLP respectively, and ROA in column (3) and (4).  In column 1, taking Q as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient of private is 0.242 with p-value below 5 percent. In column 3, 
the coefficient of private is 0.006 with p-value below 5 percent. Multiplying the coefficients with 
the means of the corresponding variables, we find from columns (1) and (3) that the firms 
without any government shareholding outperform these with a government shareholder by 10.7 
percent of Q and 10.6 percent of ROA in the robust OLS regressions. The results in MLP 
regressions are similar to those in the OLS regressions. Therefore, using the first large sample of 
mixed enterprises in China, we find that private enterprises perform better than mixed enterprises. 
  We next analyze the impact of the state owning a major interest on the firm on corporate 
value.  This involves re-estimating equation (1) using prilarge  as the proxy for the state 
ownership (Prilarge is zero if the government is the largest shareholder).  Since Chinese PLC 
can have many shareholders, the government shareholder may need a controlling stake to 
influence performance. Hence the results in Table 5 represent a stronger test of the efficiency of 
government ownership than those of Table 4.  Columns (1) and (2) take Q as the dependent 
variable using OLS and MLP methods respectively, while (3) and (4) use ROA.  We find the 
coefficients on Prilarge are positive and significant in all four regressions. The mean of Q in the 
firms with the largest shareholder as the government is 7.7 percent lower in the OLS regression 
than in those with a non-government shareholder owning the largest stake. The coefficients of 
prilarge in columns 3 and 4, which take ROA as the dependent variables, are also significant and 
positive. The mean of ROA in the firms with the largest shareholder as the government is 7.8 
percent lower than these with a non-government largest shareholder. This confirms the 
hypothesis that firms under the control of government as shareholder under-perform. Comparing 
Table 5 with Table 4, the decrease on coefficients of government shareholding probably arises 
because firms under the control of a non-government shareholder may still have a small 
government shareholder.  
  In our final experiment, we explore the relation between corporate value and the scale of 
government’s shareholding stake directly by estimating a version of equation (1) in which 
government is proxied by the proportion of shares owned by the state.  We also discuss in more 
detail the impact of the control variables on corporate value.    18
  Preliminary regressions were estimated on the assumption that the relation between 
corporate value and state was linear.  Our findings confirmed others in the literature (see e.g. 
Chen, Firth, and Rui, 2000) in that no significant relation between corporate value and state was 
identified.  However, as we argued in section 3, this may be because the relation between 
corporate value and the proportion of government shareholding is non-linear.  This view is 
suggested by the raw data.  For example, across the whole data set the average value of Q is 2.94 
for firms with zero shareholding, 2.29 for firms with a 30 percent state share but 2.6 for firms 
with an 80 percent or more state share.  Comparable figures for the ROA are 0.059, 0.04 and 
0.059 respectively. In Table 6, we therefore report results for our estimates of equation (1) with 
Git being proxied by a quadratic in State.
8  As before, columns (1) and (3) are OLS regressions 
and columns (2) and (4) are MLP regressions.  We once again observe very little difference in 
the pattern of sign and significance between the two estimation methods for the main variables of 
interest.  We employ the same proxies for corporate value; Q is columns (1) and (2) and ROA in 
column (3) and (4) and the pattern of results with respect to state ownership is similar between 
the two. 
  The coefficient on state is found to be significant and negative in all four regressions, 
while that of 
2 State is positive and significant.  Hence, corporate value decreases as the 
government’s stake increases up to a threshold at around 30-40 percent, and then begins to 
increase.  We draw the Chart for Tobin’s Q based the OLS regressions in Figure 1 below. 
Fig. 1 
                                                           
8 We also experimented with spline regressions.  We found both Q and ROA significantly decreased to a certain 
threshold and then increased significantly with the increased size of state.   19
 
  The turning points are found to be in the range of 30 percent to 40 percent, which 
interestingly represents the level at which it might be argued that the state has built a controlling 
interest in the firm. 
Table 6 also provides a good model with which to explore the impact of the vector of 
control variables in corporate value.  Commencing with the other ownership controls, the 
equations provides only limited support for the view that multiple large shareholders improve 
corporate value.  The estimated coefficient on second is positive and significant in columns (1) 
and (2) but is not significant when we use ROA as the proxy for corporate value.  This might be 
because minority shareholders benefit from the presence of multiple large shareholders, who 
reduce the private benefits of control and may facilitate takeovers.  The tunneling behavior of the 
largest shareholder may also be better monitored.  However, disagreements and bargaining 
between multiple large shareholders may also hinder efficient decision-making.  Hence the 
market value may be high with multiple shareholders but their presence does not increase 
accounting profits or ROA. 
  Managerial ownership also has no significant association with Q but a positive impact on 
ROA.  This may be because during the IPO period, the shares sold to employees and managers 
are priced at a significant discount.  The initial managerial holding depends on the rationing of 
discounted shares and the personal budget constraints of these managers.  The law forbids 
managers to trade shares when they are in office.  Thus the sizes of managerial shareholding 
stakes do not signal the quality of firms.  However, given that the shares comprise a significant 
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part of the personal wealth of the manager, managers may have sharper incentives to maximize 
corporate profitability when their personal wealth is more aligned with corporate (see Jenson and 
Meckling, 1976). The signs for coefficients of size on Q are significant negative; large 
enterprises have a relatively low corporate value.  This result is consistent with Xu and Wang 
(1999) and Qi et al. (2000).  However, the size impact is significant and positive when regressing 
ROA on Size, which is consistent with Hall and Weiss (1967).  This contradictory result may be 
due to the transitional nature of China’s stock market.  The positive sign of size on ROA 
suggests that larger firms may also be more difficult to restructure than smaller ones, which 
impact negatively on market to book values.  The regressions confirm unambiguously however 
that the asset structure influences corporate value; firms with greater intangible assets are valued 
higher in all four specifications.  We also find that higher debt is associated with a lower 
corporate value in China. This is consistent with findings for other developing countries (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001).  Pecking order 
theory may explain this; only when the firms have no internal financing resources will they 
resort to borrowing, so firms with high earnings have low gearing ratios.  This causality issue 
could complicate the models’ specification, but in fact the results of the U-shaped pattern are 
robust to the removal of gearing ratios from the regressions.  
  We also find that firm age has a negative impact on corporate value, which is consistent 
with our prediction. The theory of path dependence suggests that old firms have more entrenched 
problems, which is reflected in lower profitability and market value. Finally, the signs of stock 
exchange dummy are negative and once significant (column (1).  This suggests that, during 
1994-1998, investors favored the Shenzhen Stock Exchange more than Shanghai.  Comparing 
the stock index between 1994 and 1998 (see Table 1) we find the Shenzhen composite index rose 
144.6 percent and Shanghai by 77.0 percent.   
 
C. Is government ownership endogenous?   
  Our equations suggest that government shareholding influences corporate value in a non-
monotonic way.  However, the results may be influenced by reverse causality if the government 
shareholding is determined by prior enterprise profitability.  Moreover, since the government 
will benefit from an increase in corporate value, an understanding of the relation implied by 
equation (10) may lead to changes in ownership states.  These factors suggest that government   21
ownership stakes may be an endogenous variable in equation (10), bringing our findings into 
question if the simultaneity issue is not addressed. 
To be precise, we must test for, 
  1 it it it it Government c V Control α βε − =+× +× +     (13) 
We therefore have a simultaneous equation system, when equation 13 is combined   with 
equation 10. Table 7 uses two-stage least squares and limited information maximum likelihood 
methods to estimate the effect of government shareholding on corporate performance and 
therefore to capture the potential reverse causality. In the simultaneous equation system, 
corporate value and the size of government shareholding are jointly dependent variables. We 
take lagged corporate value, financial leverage, firm size, corporate age, and industrial sector 
dummies as the instruments.  
In the first stage regression, the coefficients on lagged corporate value are always 
insignificant. Consistent with Wei, Xie, and Zhang (2004), this suggests that firm performance 
was actually not an important determinant of state ownership Chinese PLCs. Reporting the 
second stage regressions, Table 7 further confirms the findings of Table 6. The coefficients on 
State are positive and these on 
2 State  are negative. The turning points remain around 30 percent. 
Even taking into account reverse causality, the main results of the previous sections remain 
unchanged. Perhaps this is not surprising because the Chinese government has always argued 
that its shares in PLCs were not sold for revenue purposes. The ideology of the communist party 
has been the driving force behind the privatization policy, not government revenue targets, and 
the declared objective behind selling state shares has been to restructure enterprises (see 
Measures on the Shareholding Experiment", State Council, 15 May 1992).  
With regard to seasoned equity offerings, the central government encourages its agents 
that hold the state’s shares to maintain their stake unchanged, and it does not allocate a sufficient 
budget for seasoned equities. The purchase of seasoned shares therefore depends on the budget 
constraints of the agents who hold state shares. In practice, changes in state ownership after the 
IPO have been small and are driven by political factors since the control rights of the government 
shareholder have almost always been diluted.  
As for the block transfer of state shares, enterprise restructuring is again stipulated to be 
the target rather than privatization revenue. In several cases, the government has granted its 
shares to strategic investors. For example, in 1997 the government gave away for nothing its   22
shares in Tianjin Meilun to Tianjin Taida Group Co. Transfers of state shares, including both 
grant transfers and negotiated transfers, usually work towards injecting new capital into the 
company and updating its technology rather than raising revenue (Securities Times, 2000).  
Both the empirical evidence and the institutional arrangements therefore lead us to 
conclude that endogeneity of state ownership has not been a significant issue in Chinese PLCs 
during our data period. The non-monotonic relation between state shareholding and corporate 
value is found to reflect mainly causality from ownership to corporate value. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
  China continues to follow its own unique reform path, including in its “privatization” of 
the large former SOEs.  The approach has been to sell shares in the companies, in the hope of 
inspiring performance via improved incentives, monitoring and corporate governance.  However, 
the state has retained very significant shareholdings in many of these companies, though they are 
listed on the Chinese stock exchanges.  In this paper, we have attempted to identify the scale and 
impact of state ownership on corporate performance in China. 
  Our results confirm findings in the literature for other economies that the overall impact 
of government shareholding is negative in China. However, in China’s unique set of mixed 
ownership enterprises, the relation between the extent of government shareholding and corporate 
performance is complex.  Our empirical work draws on a unique new data set of Chinese PLCs.  
We find that the detrimental effects of state shareholding is not monotonic but initially declines 
as the state retains some shares, up to a holding of between 30 percent and 40 percent, and 
increases thereafter.  On average, state ownership reduced value by between 10 percent and 20 
percent at the minimum, relative to entirely private firms.  However, the negative impact of 
dominant state ownership is rather less; only around 5 percent. We argued that this might be 
because the efficiency of managerial decision making is reduced when managers have to balance 
the competing claims of large private and a large state shareholder.  Moreover, in the Chinese 
context, the state has the power to distort outcomes in favor of the firms that it owns, and it has 
the incentive to do so when its shareholding stakes are high.  In this sense, Chinese firms can 
benefit from a concentrated owner, whether that owner is private or the state. 
  This U-shaped relation between government ownership and corporate values therefore 
arises because the utility function of the government contains financial as well as political   23
variables.  The political interests of the government cause a reallocation of corporate resources, 
which is detrimental to a firm. But when it is pursuing the financial interests that lie in its cash 
flow rights, the government can provide some degree of effective corporate governance, 
depending on the size of its shareholding, and can act with benevolence and partiality. We infer 
that the value of a firm decreases as government shareholding stakes increase until a certain 
threshold, because when the government is a small shareholder, it has neither the authority nor 
the incentive to provide the preferential treatment and benevolence that would outweigh the 
disadvantages of its political interference.  If the presence of a government shareholder is to be 
beneficial to a firm, its shareholding stakes must be relatively large. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix:  
Data Sources 
 Data  Sources  Reliability 
    
Share price data  Datastream Inc.  Established  International  Renown 
Data Specialist 
    
Accountancy data 
before IPO  
Taiwan Economic 
Journal 
The leading data specialist company 
in Taiwan and the major Chinese 
data vendor to Reuters, Datastream 
etc.  
    
Accountancy data 
after IPO  
Genius Inc.   More than 80 percent Chinese 
investment bankers and security 
analysts rely on the data provided by   24
this company. 
    
State ownership   Genius Inc.    
    
Board of directors   Taiwan Economic 
Journal 
 
    
Large shareholders  Beijing Hairong Inc.  The major financial data specialist 
company in Beijing.   
    
Industrial 
classification 
China Securities Daily   The leading newspaper on finance 
and securities in China 
    
Block transfer   China Securities Daily   
    
State-share transfer  Securities Times  A major newspaper on securities in 
China 
    
    
With regards to accountancy and ownership data, the validity of the data sets has 
been crosschecked and missing points were made up based on annual reports form 
the website managed by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  http://www.cninfo.com.cn/.   25
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Table 1: Chinese Stock Market 
This table presents the market capitalization over Chinese GDP, number of shareholders of the listed companies, number of listed companies, stock market indexes, turnover 
rates, and price/earning ratios. It covers a period from 1992 to 1998. The Chinese stock market is separated into the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
The market capitalization and the number of investors are the aggregated number from both the exchanges. Our data sources are the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, and China Securities Regulation Commission. Capitalization of Germany and UK equity markets are based on Bank of England, the factbook of the London 
Stock Exchange. The P/E ratio is from the Bloomberg system.  
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1998 
 China  China    HK  Japan  Germany  UK    USA 
(NYSE) 
Market Cap over GDP 
( percent) 
3.9 10.2 7.9  5.9 14.5  23.4  24.5   198  72  32  165  - 
Investors  (millions)  2.2  7.8  10.6 12.4 23.1 33.3  39.1             
Newly Listed Companies  39  130  108  32  207  215  106    32  57  68  233  228 
Total  Companies  53  183 291 323 530 745  851  680  1890  741  2921  3114 
    Shanghai  29  106  171  188  293  383  438             
    Shenzhen  24  77  120  135  237  362  413             
Composite  Index             10048  13842  4845  5882  9181 
    Shanghai  780.4  833.8  647.9  555.3  917.0  1194.1 1146.7             
    Shenzhen  241.2  238.3  140.6  113.3  327.3  381.3  343.9             
Trading Values (US $Bil.) 8.2  44.2  97.9  48.6  257.1  370.1  283.7    206.2  750.8  945.1  2887.9  7318.0 
Turnover  Rate  (times)             62  34  -  47  70 
    Shanghai  -  341  787  396  591  326  297             
    Shenzhen  -  213  472  180  902  466  283             
P/E  Ratio             11.1  155.1  34.8  23.1  22.0 
    Shanghai  -  42.5  23.5  15.7  31.3  39.9  34.4             
    Shenzhen  -  42.7  10.3  9.5  35.4  41.2  32.3             
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Table 2: Shareholding Structures of Chinese Quoted Firms 
Panel A: Proportion of Companies with a Single Shareholding in Excess of 10 percent, 30 percent, or 50 percent  
This table summarizes the proportion of companies with a large shareholder. Companies are divided into those that have one shareholder owning at least 10 
percent, 30 percent, or 50 percent of the voting equity. It is based on the 1998 data of 826 companies. Data for firms in Hong Kong and Japan comes from 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); Data for firms in the UK and Germany is from Faccio and Lang (2002).  
  Largest shareholder 50 percent  30 percent  10 
percent 
10 percent Cut-off 
       China  HK  UK  Germany Japan
Another Domestic Company  39.2  10.5  27.3  41.2  23.9  0.9  1.2  5.3 
Trust, Securities and Other Financial 
Companies 
10.9 0.8  2.5  4.4  7.1  32.6  10.4  38.5 
Foreign 5.1  0.0  3.1  6.2  -  -  -  - 
Family   0.0  0.0  0  0  64.7  33.8  71.6  13.1 
State 43.9  31.4  37.8  43.8  3.7  0.2  5.2  1.1 
Others 0.8  0  3.8  2.4  0  6.3  7.2  0 
Companies without a large shareholding 
greater than 10 percent, 30 percent, 50 
percent 
 57.2  25.4  2.1  0.6  26.2  4.40  42 
                
Ratio of Cash Flow to Voting Rights        99.9  88.2  86.3  84.2  60.2 
Panel B: Shareholding fractions of the 10 largest shareholders 
This table summarizes the average shareholding fractions of the ten largest shareholders in mixed enterprises, no-state-shareholding enterprises, enterprises 
with the government as the largest shareholder and enterprises with a non-government entity as the largest shareholder. 1
st is the largest, 2
nd is the second 
largest, and so on. The data apply to 826 firms in 1998.  
  1st   2nd  3rd   4th   5th   6th   7th   8th   9th   10th 
              
Mixed  Enterprises  42.5 10.1 3.8 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Private  Enterprises  41.5 11.7 4.8 2.6 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Enterprises  with  government  as  the  largest  shareholder  46.1 8.1  3.0 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Enterprises  with  a  non-government  largest  shareholder  40.1 12.3 5.0 2.7 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Total    42.1 10.7 4.2 2.2 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4   32
Table 3:  Comparing the Value and Characteristics of Firms 
NSEs are enterprises with no state shareholding. NSLs are firms whose largest shareholder is not 
the state (non-state largest shareholder) and SLs are firms where the State is the largest 
shareholder. A NSmaj is an enterprise in which the major shareholder is a non-government entity. 
A Smaj is an enterprise in which the government holds more than 50 percent of shares. The 
asterisks show the range of P or z-values: *** as p or z-value≤ 1 percent, ** p or z-value≤ 5 
percent, * p or z-value≤ 10 percent. 
 
 
     (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Items     NSEs  MEs    NSL  SL  NSmaj  Smaj  All 
Q Mean    2.935  2.467***    2.817  2.457*** 2.995  2.547***  2.604 
 Median    2.547  2.197***    2.450  2.190*** 2.603  2.303***  2.291 
                    
ROE Mean    0.059  0.050***    0.056  0.050*** 0.074  0.054***  0.053 
 Median    0.063  0.054***    0.063  0.054*** 0.074  0.056***  0.058 
                    
Observations     778  1882    1089  1571  348  1028  2660   33
Table 4: Does the government as shareholder influence value? 
This table reports the regressions of Q in columns 1 and 2 and ROA in columns 3 and 4 on 
whether the government is a shareholder and whether the government is the largest shareholder. 
The table comprises 2660 firm-year observations. Private is the dummy variable that is zero 
when the government is a shareholder. Columns 1 and 3 reports the robust pooled OLS 
regression (OLS) and Columns 2 and 4 for the maximum log likelihood regressions (MLP). 
Standard deviations are given in brackets. The asterisks show the range of P-values: *** as p-
value≤ 1 percent, ** p-value≤ 5 percent, * p-value≤ 10 percent. 
 (1)        (2)  (3)  (4) 
 OLS        MLP  OLS  MLP 
 Q        Q  ROA  ROA 
Private  0.242**       0.229***      0.006**       0.005** 
  (0.077)        (0.065)       (0.003)      (0.003) 
                       
Second  0.114*       0.115*      -0.005       -0.003 
  (0.063)        (0.066)       (0.003)      (0.003) 
                       
Manager  0.159       0.603       0.305***        0.284** 
  (1.883)        (2.849)       (0.069)      (0.144) 
                       
Herfindahl  6.452***       9.362***      0.184***       0.295*** 
  (1.646)        (2.034)       (0.066)      (0.090) 
                       
Size  -0.583**       -0.608***        0.029***       0.034*** 
  (0.062)        (0.070)       (0.004)      (0.003) 
                       
Tangible  -0.496       -0.433        -0.025       -0.028 
  (0.227)        (0.213)       (0.008)      (0.008) 
                       
Gear  -1.702***       -1.424***       -0.164***       -0.154*** 
  (0.355)        (0.175)       (0.025)      (0.007) 
                       
Age  -0.004***       -0.005      -0.0002***      -0.0003* 
  (0.001)        (0.002)       (0.000)      (0.000) 
                       
Exchange  -0.178**       -0.118        -0.003        -0.001 
  (0.052)        (0.069)       (0.002)      (0.003) 
                       
Industry  Yes.       Yes.      Yes.       Yes. 
                       
Year  Yes.       Yes.      Yes.       Yes. 
                       
Constant  8.130***       8.351***       -0.110***        -0.136*** 
  (0.545)        (0.627)       (0.029)      (0.025) 
                       
------------  ------------       ------------      ------------       ------------ 
R-squared  0.504      -4357.9      0.427        4154.7 
F statistic  34.95       410.29        14.10        772.32 
Significance  0.000       0.000      0.000       0.000   34
Table 5: Does the government as the largest shareholder affect value? 
This table reports the regressions of Q in columns 1 and 2 and ROA in columns 3 and 4 on 
whether the government is the largest shareholder. The table comprises 2660 firm-year 
observations. Prilage is the dummy that is zero when a private agent is the largest shareholder. 
Columns 1 and 3 reports the robust pooled OLS regression (OLS) and Columns 2 and 4 for the 
maximum log likelihood regressions (MLP). Standard deviations are given in brackets.  The 
asterisks show the range of P-values: *** as p-value≤ 1 percent, ** p-value≤ 5 percent, * p-
value≤ 10 percent. 
 (1)  (2)    (3)        (4) 
  OLS       MLP       OLS       MLP  
  Q       Q        ROA        Q   
Prilarge  0.172***       0.161***        0.005**        0.005**   
  (0.061)      (0.060)       (0.003)        (0.002)   
                           
Second  0.087       0.080        -0.005       -0.004   
  (0.067)      (0.068)       (0.003)        (0.003)   
                           
Manager  0.413       0.825        0.310***        0.288**   
  (1.868)      (2.852)       (0.070)        (0.113)   
                           
Herfindahl  6.513***       9.426***        0.186***       0.298***   
  (2.067)      (2.033)       (0.066)        (0.091)   
                           
Size  -0.581***     -0.608***      0.030***       0.034***  
  (0.062)      (0.070)       (0.004)        (0.003)   
                           
Tangible  -0.493       -0.429       -0.025**     -0.028  
  (0.226)      (0.213)       (0.008)        (0.008)   
                           
Gear  -1.721***     -1.434***      -0.164***       -0.154***  
  (0.360)      (0.175)       (0.025)        (0.007)   
                           
Age  -0.005***      -0.005       -0.0002***     -0.0003**   
  (0.001)      (0.002)       (0.000)        (0.000)   
                           
Exchange  -0.177**       -0.120       -0.003     -0.001  
  (0.053)      (0.070)       (0.002)        (0.003)   
                           
Industry  Yes.       Yes.       Yes.       Yes.   
                           
Year  Yes.       Yes.       Yes.       Yes.   
                           
Constant  8.109***       8.353***        -0.111***       -0.137***   
  (0.551)      (0.629)       (0.029)        (0.025)   
                           
------------  ------------       ------------       ------------       ------------   
R^2/Log Likelihood  0.511       -4360.6        0.425       4154.5   
F/Chi^2 statistic  34.83       402.94       14.08     771.82  
Significance  0.000       0.000        0.000       0.000     35
Table 6: Polynomial regressions on the impact of state ownership 
This table reports the regressions of Q and ROA on the fraction of government shareholding, 
using 2660 firm-year observations. State2 is the squared form of state shareholding (State). Panel 
1 presents the results of the robust pooled OLS regression (OLS) and Panel 2 the maximum 
likelihood random effect panel model regression (MLP). Standard deviations are given in 
brackets. The asterisks behind the coefficient show the range of P-values: *** as p-value≤ 1 
percent, ** p-value≤ 5 percent, * p-value≤ 10 percent. 
   (1)    (2)    (2)    (4) 
   OLS    MLP    OLS    MLP 
   Q    Q    ROA    ROA 
State   -1.493***  -1.367***    -0.035**   -0.039** 
   (0.335)  (0.412)    (0.016)  (0.017) 
            
State2   2.562***  2.318***    0.045**   0.048** 
   (0.412)  (0.580)    (0.021)  (0.024) 
            
Prilarge   0.416**  0.426***    0.013***   0.013*** 
   (0.189)  (0.107)    (0.005)  (0.005) 
            
Second     0.205***  0.188***    -0.005    -0.003 
   (0.078)  (0.067)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
            
Manager   1.211  1.475    0.314***   0.298** 
   (1.793)  (2.826)    (0.080)  (0.125) 
            
Size   -0.642***  -0.654***    0.012***   0.014*** 
   (0.065)  (0.070)    (0.002)  (0.001) 
            
Tangible   -0.524**  -0.474**    -0.029***  -0.033*** 
   (0.224)  (0.211)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
            
Gear   -1.661***  -1.389***    -0.168***  -0.160*** 
   (0.359)  (0.174)    (0.027)  (0.007) 
            
Age   -0.004***  -0.005**    -0.0002***   -0.0003*** 
   (0.001)  (0.002)    (0.0001)   (0.0001) 
            
Exchange   0.158***   -0.102    -0.002    -0.001 
   (0.051)  (0.069)    (0.002)  (0.003) 
Industry   Yes.  Yes.    Yes.  Yes. 
Year   Yes.  Yes.    Yes.  Yes. 
Constant   8.580***  8.674***    -0.096***  -0.120*** 
   (0.572)  (0.621)    (0.032)  (0.027) 
--------   ------------  ------------    ------------   ------------ 
R^2/ Log Likelihood    0.228   -4343.9    0.293  3594.9 
F/Chi statistic    34.63   438.14    12.68  727.60 
Significance   0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Turning point    0.291  0.295    0.389  0.378 
   36
Table 7: Instrumental variable regressions on the state shareholding 
This table reports the regressions of Q and ROA on the fraction of government shareholding, 
using 2660 firm-year observations. State2 is the square of state shareholding (State). The robust 
clustered two stage least square regression (2SLS) and the limited information maximum 
likelihood regression (LIME) are reported here. The size of government shareholding, state, is 
instrumented on lagged Q or ROA, financial leverage, firm size, corporate age, industrial sector 
dummies. Standard deviations are given in brackets. The asterisks behind the coefficient show 
the range of P-values: *** as p-value≤ 1 percent, ** p-value≤ 5 percent, * p-value≤ 10 percent. 
   (1)    (2)    (2)    (4) 
   2SLS    LIME    2SLS    LIME 
   Q    Q    ROA    ROA 
State   -1.399***   -1.407***    -0.027*   -0.032* 
   (0.372)    (0.337)    (0.015)    (0.018) 
              
State2   2.099***   2.109***    0.042*   0.056** 
   (0.446)    (0.394)    (0.024)    (0.024) 
              
Prilarge   0.008   0.007    0.002   0.003 
   (0.064)    (0.071)    (0.006)    (0.004) 
              
Second     0.133**   0.133***    -0.005  -0.007** 
   (0.058)    (0.045)    (0.004)    (0.003) 
              
Manager   -3.175**   -3.181**    0.325***   0.377*** 
   (1.369)    (1.602)    (0.110)    (0.098) 
              
Size   -0.295***   -0.295***    0.013***   0.003** 
   (0.034)    (0.022)    (0.002)    (0.001) 
              
Tangible   -0.146   -0.146    -0.025**    -0.023*** 
   (0.170)    (0.128)    (0.010)    (0.008) 
              
Gear   -0.924***   -0.921    -0.164***   -0.149*** 
   (0.153)    (0.104)***    (0.026)    (0.006) 
              
Age   -0.002   -0.002    -0.000**   -0.000** 
   (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
              
Exchange   -0.017    -0.017  -0.003    -0.006** 
   (0.050)    (0.036)    (0.003)    (0.002) 
Industry   Yes.   Yes.    Yes.   Yes. 
Year   Yes.   Yes.    Yes.   Yes. 
Constant   8.067***   8.074***    -0.106***   0.073*** 
   (0.729)    (0.457)    (0.036)    (0.028) 
--------              
R^2   0.317   0.317    0.286   0.242 
F/Chi statistic    30.26  1217    12.23    836 
Significance   0.32    0.32  0.29    0.24 
Turning point    0.333   0.334    0.321   0.286  
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